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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal civil rulemaking, the process by which the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are created and maintained, has simultaneously been 
described as a crisis and a crowning achievement.1 Some have argued the 
rulemakers are hidebound because of their ideological background.2 
* Associate Dean of Research & Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Seattle University
School of Law. 
1. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685 (1975) (recommending changes in Supreme Court rulemaking); Richard 
L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 903 (2002) (“[There are] pervasive 
and valid concerns about a crisis in rulemaking.”); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of 
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (1989) (“Deficiencies in contemporary civil procedure 
notwithstanding, I view fifty years of federal civil rulemaking as a success.”). 
2. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 
52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613-17, 636-37 (2001) (noting the conservative and defense orientation of 
1
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Others have pointed to the stability of the process and argued that, while 
imperfect, the system works.3 This Article departs from this binary and 
pragmatically turns to how the committee operates. Using the lens of 
discovery reform, this Article examines how the rulemaking process has 
evolved over the past 35 years. The ups and downs of discovery reform 
have inspired the committee to adopt many modern rulemaking 
innovations. Those innovations, this Article argues, are critical to the 
success of the rulemaking process because they provide rulemakers with 
better information. Finally, discovery reform and the committee’s 
responsive innovations are true to the ethos of the rulemaking process, a 
process that was designed to be reflective, deliberative, and adaptive.4 
II. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RULEMAKING PROCESS
The federal civil rulemaking process has evolved over time and is 
currently a combination of statutory mandate, official guidelines, and 
unofficial custom. This section will discuss the basic civil rulemaking 
process as well as what information the rulemakers rely on while 
considering rule proposals. 
A. The Steps of the Rulemaking Process 
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 delegated authority to the Supreme 
Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” for the federal 
courts.5 The Court promptly appointed a committee of experts to draft and 
vet the rules, but it did so without providing guidance beyond that main 
rulemaking and recommending greater “socio-political makeup”); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over 
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 
798-801 (1991) (“[There is an] increased politicization of the civil rulemaking process.”). 
3. Marcus, supra note 1, at 903 (“Despite the pervasive and valid concerns about a crisis in
rulemaking, it concludes that some modest reform is possible, and that rulemaking’s inability to 
deliver revolutionary change may not be a bad thing.”); Remarks of Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summary 
Judgment Changes That Weren’t, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 471, 496 (2012) (“In the work that led to the 
rule changes that weren’t, the Rules Enabling Act process worked well. The Rules Committees 
gathered information in a disciplined and thorough way, through miniconferences in advance of 
formal rulemaking, through a robust public comment period, and through empirical study.”). 
4. The Hon. Mark R. Kravitz et al., They Were Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward
Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 517 (2013) (“That flexibility and 
discretion, built into the 1934 Act, has helped produce the continued and current success of the 
process.”). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2016). 
2
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directive of “draft the rules.”6 Since then, the rulemaking process has 
evolved to become more transparent, multifaceted, and hierarchical.7 
The details of the modern rulemaking process are instructive.8 First, 
an idea about a new rule or how an existing rule can be improved or 
changed originates within the committee or comes to the committee from 
an outside source.9 Once the civil rules committee moves an idea forward, 
it deliberates over the proposal in one or more of its biannual meetings.10 
If the committee arrives at a proposal that it likes, it then forwards the 
proposal on to the Standing Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice 
and Procedure to ask for its approval to publish the proposal.11 Assuming 
the Standing Committee approves the rule, it is published for public 
comment.12 The committee receives comments, and if the rule is 
controversial enough, it might also hold public hearings to discuss the 
rule.13 Once the committee has received all of these comments, it then 
reconsiders the rule.14 It might tweak the rule a bit, or it might decide to 
forego the rule altogether.15 
If the committee moves forward with the proposal, it sends the final 
version to the Standing Committee for its approval once again.16 
Assuming the Standing Committee approves the rule change, it forwards 
the rule to the Judicial Conference of the United States.17 If the Judicial 
Conference approves the rule change, it then sends the change to the 
6. Order Appointing Comm. to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 
(1934) (“Pursuant to Section 2 of the Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, the Court will 
undertake the preparation of a unified system of general rules for cases in equity and actions at law in 
the District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, so as 
to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both classes of’ cases, while maintaining inviolate 
the right of trial by jury in accordance with the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States and without altering substantive rights.”). 
7. Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 277 (2009). 
8. For a detailed discussion of the rulemaking process, see generally Stephen B. Burbank,
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (providing an exhaustive overview 
of the origins of the Rules Enabling Act and history of the rulemaking process); Coleman, supra note 
7.  
9. James C. Duff, Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, The Federal Rules of Practice, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-
process/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://perma.cc/B325-
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Supreme Court.18 If the Court approves the change, it forwards it on to 
Congress, whereby under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress can vote to 
modify or defeat the rule.19 If Congress does not take any action, the rule 
becomes law.20 This process takes about three years from start to finish, 
assuming that all goes as planned. Anywhere along the way, the rule can 
be tabled or defeated. 
The committee members are appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court.21 There are 14 people on the committee, 
including a chairperson and a reporter, the latter of which does not vote.22 
A member of the Department of Justice, most often the Deputy Attorney 
General, sits ex officio on the committee as well, bringing the membership 
total to 15.23 The individuals who serve on the committee are experts in 
civil litigation. Most committee members are federal judges, but 
practitioners and academics serve on the committee too.24 
B. The Informational Inputs of the Rulemaking Process 
The original advisory committee relied on its individual members’ 
experiences, and it called on select members of the bench and bar for their 
thoughts on the 1938 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.25 
Over time, however, the committee has looked to additional information 
inputs when considering changes to the civil rules. Now, in addition to the 
rulemakers’ own experiences, members of the committee depend on 
several of what this Article calls “information inputs.” The main three 
categories of information inputs are: (i) empirical research, (ii) specialized 
conferences, and (iii) rulemaking research and development (rulemaking 
18. Id. The Court considers the rule proposals and must send any proposed amendments to
Congress by May 1st of the year the amendments are supposed to take effect.  
19. Id.
20. Id. If Congress does not act, the rules become law on December 1st of the year the
amendments are intended to take effect.  
21. Committee Membership Selection, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection 
[https://perma.cc/8GVU-6NYZ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
22. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, 1-2 (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/2017_committee_roster_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQV8-SS8M]. 
23. Id. at 2. 
24. Id. at 1-2. 
25. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 725-30 (1998). The rules were circulated for comment 
to a select group of attorneys and judges on two occasions (May 1936 and April 1937) during that 
four-year period. Id. 
4
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R&D). This section will briefly describe each of these inputs and provide 
examples of when the committee has used them. 
First, the committee often relies on empirical research.26 This 
research can take many forms ranging from brief reports to lengthy 
studies. It can also arise internally—either by request of the committee to 
outside parties or by request to individual members or a sub-committee—
or it can arise externally—when an outside party provides the committee 
with its research as part of a proposal for a rule change or as part of its 
support for the same.27 
The internal research is inspired by committee request. The 
committee might ask the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to study an issue 
over which it is deliberating. For example, following the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the committee asked the FJC to study 
how the decisions impacted motion to dismiss rates.28 Or, the committee 
might rely on someone closer to the committee like a committee member, 
sub-committee, or staff member. For example, the committee asked then-
Chair Judge Rosenthal’s rules clerk, Andrea Kuperman, to similarly 
follow the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, which she did.29 This kind of 
empirical work is directed by the committee and is therefore quite specific 
and controlled. 
External empirical research is less predictable because individuals or 
entities that are seeking a specific rule change or that are advocating 
against or in support of a proposed rule change provide the information. 
26. Kravitz et al., supra note 4, at 514–15 (“The result is a modern approach to rulemaking
that heavily relies on empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center and the collection of information 
through national and regional conferences and calls for comment.”). 
27. How to Suggest a Change to the Rules of Practice and Procedure and Forms, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-
process/how-suggest-change-rules-practice-and-procedure-and-forms [https://perma.cc/KZ2L-
LAM2] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018). 
28. Mark R. Kravitz, et al., Advisory Comm. on Fed. R. of Civ. P., Report of the Civil Rules
Advisory Comm. to the Standing Comm. on the Rules of Practice and Procedure 54 (May 2, 2011) in 
Agenda Materials from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 217 (June 2-3, 2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/committee-rules-practice-and-
procedure-june-2011 [https://perma.cc/NV8X-BUBB] (“The [Civil Rules Committee’s] approach to 
pleading practice remains what it has been since 2007. The Committee will closely monitor 
developing practice, it will encourage and heed further rigorous empirical work, and it will listen 
carefully to the voices of bench, bar, and academy. Procedural ferment is exciting, but it does not 
justify an excited response.”); see generally, Joe S. Cecil et al., Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State 
a Claim After Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUD. 
CTR. (Mar. 2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MotionIqbal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQF7-KQ6D] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
29. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to
Civil Rules Committee 1-2 (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
andrea_kuperman_iqbal_memo_april_2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFR5-UNWM]. 
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This means the information is the product of an agenda that is sometimes, 
at least initially, external to the committee’s agenda. Sometimes this work 
will be included in a request for the committee to take on a rule 
amendment. For example, the Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System at the University of Denver and the American 
College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery conducted a joint 
project that resulted in a number of proposals that it shared with the 
committee (and included in the reports and studies).30 
In other cases, external empirical research might be provided to the 
committee during the comment period on an already proposed rule 
change.31 For example, during the notice and comment period for the 2015 
discovery amendments, Microsoft representatives testified about the rule, 
providing the committee with a visual aid detailing how much 
documentation Microsoft preserves for potential litigation versus how 
much documentation it actually used in trial.32 The committee does not 
request this external empirical research, but it often uses the information 
in its deliberations. 
In addition to empirical research, the committee receives information 
inputs from specialized conferences. In these conferences, the committee 
invites experts to present and engage about a topic the committee is 
considering. The most notable of these conferences was the 2010 Duke 
Conference, where the Civil Rules Committee invited elite practitioners, 
judges, and academics to broadly consider the civil justice system, but 
specifically discovery reform.33 There have been several other 
conferences, however, covering subjects ranging from class actions to e-
discovery.34 
30. Brittany K.T. Kauffman, Initial Disclosures: The Past, Present, and Future of Discovery, 
AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2018).  
31. See, e.g., Archived Rule Comments, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/archived-rules-
comments [https://perma.cc/735E-YU99] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
32. See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Before Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 79–81 (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9446/download [https://perma.cc/BYP5-KRG3]. Microsoft’s attorney 
David M. Howard stated: 
To put it another way, for each page that is actually used in evidence, we produce 1,000 
pages, review 4,000 pages, process 120,000 pages, and preserve over 670,000 pages. 
Depending on the [type] of case, we spend 30 to 50 percent of our out-of-pocket litigation 
dollars on discovery. In the last decade, we paid about $600 million in fees.  
Id. at 80. 
33. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2016). 
34. Kravitz et al., supra note 4. 
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Finally, what this Article calls “rulemaking R&D” provides another 
source of information inputs for the committee. Rulemaking R&D is when 
the committee puts forward a proposed rule change before officially 
publishing it for public comments. This rulemaking R&D can arise in a 
range of formats. For example, from 2015 to 2016, the committee 
circulated a set of “rule amendment sketches” to the class action rule.35 
Various members of the sub-committee responsible for those “sketches” 
then traveled to different conferences and gatherings to garner feedback 
on the proposals—all of this took place well before anything had been 
officially considered by the committee, let alone published for public 
comment.36 More recently, and as discussed in more detail in Section III, 
the committee is running pilot projects where specific district courts pilot 
a potential rule change and gather information and feedback about how 
that rule change might work.37 
These inputs—empirical research, specialized conferences, and 
rulemaking R&D—are important innovations in the rulemaking process 
because they have expanded the information upon which the rulemaking 
committee relies. The next section will focus in greater detail on how 
discovery reform has contributed to expanding these information inputs. 
III. DISCOVERY REFORM & RULEMAKING INNOVATION
Rulemaking innovation in the form of empirical research, specialized 
conferences, and rulemaking R&D is now part of the civil rulemaking 
process. This section argues that much of this innovation is the result of 
discovery reform. More specifically, modern discovery reform and its 
successes and failures have driven the committee to look for new ways to 
innovate. These innovations—while imperfect—are ultimately positive 
because they demonstrate how nimble the rulemaking process can be. To 
respond to the evolving challenges of the civil justice system, the process 
must be willing to adapt. Through discovery reform and responsive 
innovation, the committee has done just that. 
35. Introductory Materials, Rule 23 Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Mini-
Conference On Rule 23 Issues, 1 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule_23_mini-conference_materials.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R7ET-ZM7A]. 
36. Richard Marcus, Once More Unto The Breach? Further Reforms Considered for Rule 23,
99 JUDICATURE 56, 57-65 (Summer 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/links/2016_cads/063015_rul
e_23_marcus_reprint.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/97EC-DMAS]. 
37. See infra Section III notes and accompanying text.
7
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A. Modern Discovery Reform 
The original discovery rules, namely under Rule 26, allowed for the 
discovery of all relevant information related to the subject matter of the 
litigation.38 These new discovery rules did not maintain the status quo and 
represented the committee’s sense that the rules should encourage a free 
exchange of information, lest there be any surprises at trial.39 The 
Advisory Committee note to the original Rule 26 stated, “[w]hile the old 
chancery practice limited discovery to facts supporting the case of the 
party seeking it, this limitation has been largely abandoned by modern 
legislation.”40 The new civil rules ushered in a new age of discovery, 
where each party could obtain the information it needed, limited only by 
objections of attorney-client privilege and relevance.41 
But, that was 1934. By the time the rules committee convened in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing sense, if not reality, that 
the civil justice system could no longer bear the pressure created by 
unfettered discovery.42 It is this change that ushered in modern discovery 
reform. 
This section will detail five primary periods in discovery reform by 
highlighting the major change made to the discovery rules during each 
period. This Article will then identify and examine the consequential or 
corresponding rulemaking innovations adopted by the committee. While 
not all rulemaking innovations are the direct product of discovery reform, 
this section will show that discovery reform is at least partly responsible 
for the committee’s adaptive responses within modern civil rulemaking. 
The five primary discovery reform periods are as follows: (i) the 
1983 amendments to the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1); (ii) the 
1993 amendments adopting mandatory initial disclosure in Rule 26(a)(1); 
(iii) the 2000 amendments modifying mandatory initial disclosure under 
Rule 26(a)(1); (iv) the 2006 electronic discovery amendments; and (v) the 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
39. See Subrin, supra note 25, at 710; Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-
Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215, 216–19 (1937). 
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. Similarly, in 1946,
Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to clarify that parties could seek inadmissible evidence through discovery. 
The Advisory Committee note explained, “[t]he purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for 
facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or 
presentation of his case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
41. Work product protection, or trial preparation material protection, was codified in 1970.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. This codification followed 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, where the Court ostensibly created 
that protection. See 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
42. Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1784–85 (2015). 
8
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2015 proportionality amendments. While there were other changes made 
to the rules—discovery or otherwise—in each of these periods, this 
section will focus only on the primary changes to discovery. 
B. Discovery Reform, Controversy, and Responsive Innovation 
The first major changes to discovery appear in 1983. The most 
significant change was to amend Rule 26(b)(1) to add factors meant to 
assist judges in addressing what the committee called “over-discovery.”43 
The new language provided the first iteration of “proportionality” 
language, stating in part that a judge must assess whether “[t]he discovery 
is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and 
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.”44 The committee 
expressed concern that judges had “been reluctant to limit the use of the 
discovery devices” in the past.45 This new rule language, the committee 
hoped, would allow the court to reduce the amount of discovery and help 
prevent redundant or disproportionate discovery.46 These changes caused 
much controversy. 
Along with—and largely eclipsing—this discovery amendment, the 
committee also adopted controversial amendments to Rule 11 that 
provided for mandatory sanctions in the event the court determined a 
filing was frivolous.47 Primarily, in response to the Rule 11 amendments, 
but also in response to the discovery amendments, scholars criticized the 
information—or rather lack thereof—on which the committee relied.48 
This led to a notable study of the impact of Rule 11 by a Third Circuit task 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment, subdiv. (b): Discovery
Scope and Limitations. 
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 214-15 (1983). 
45. Id. at 217. 
46. Id.
47. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the
Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 93, 100–01 (1993) (discussing the evolution of Rule 11). 
48. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (1989) (“First, Rule 11 was amended but six years ago, and 
the amended Rule was avowedly an experiment. The Advisory Committee knew little about 
experience under the original Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that stimulated the efforts 
leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983, knew little about the 
jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the benefits and costs of sanctions as a case 
management device.”). However, the criticism was not limited to Rule 11. Id. at 1928 (“[T]he 1983 
amendment of Rule 11 was but one of a number of amendments, a package, moreover, that was sent 
to Congress only three years after another.”).  
9
Coleman: Discovery Reform and Federal Civil Rulemaking
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
774 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:765 
force, the results of which were published in 1989.49 The committee did 
not commission this report, but it no doubt took note of the value of such 
empirical research.50 
The committee went back to work, and in 1993 it published another 
set of amendments to both Rule 11 and Rule 26.51 These amendments 
fared no better and incited further controversy.52 Indeed, even members 
of the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the rules package.53 
Leaving to the side the changes to Rule 11,54 the discovery rules were 
amended to require mandatory initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1).55 
These disclosures included basic information such as documents, 
witnesses, and damages information the parties might have.56 The 
controversy over the rule was multilayered and ideologically vast: (i) it 
required disclosure of this information not just as it related to a plaintiff’s 
claim or a defendant’s defense, but instead as it related to the subject 
matter of the litigation; (ii) it assailed the adversarial system by requiring 
disclosure without an adversarial request; and (iii) it only required 
production for issues pleaded with particularity.57 In other words, no one 
was happy. To mitigate this controversy, the new rule explicitly allowed 
for a district court to “opt out” of the rule if it was so inclined.58 This, of 
49. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989). Burbank, a strong critic of the Rule 
11 amendments, served as reporter of the Task Force and principal author of the report. Id. 
50. Id.
51. In the meantime, Congress and the executive branch intervened in civil litigation as well.
Then-Vice President Dan Quayle famously headed a “Commission on Competitiveness” to look at 
the civil justice system. Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need 
Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 303 (1994). Similarly, then-Senator Joe Biden led the charge toward 
the adoption of the Civil Justice Reform Act. Id. 
52. Id. at 295 (“The 1993 revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evoked more
vigorous opposition than any rule revision ever promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, save the single exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Much, but by no means all, of the 
criticism has been directed at . . . Rule 26(a)(1) . . . .”). 
53. See H.R. DOC. NO. 74, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 104 (1993) (dissenting statement of
Justice Scalia). Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s adoption of amendments to Rule 11 
(sanctions) and to Rules 26, 30, 31, 33, and 37 (discovery). Justice Thomas joined in full, while Justice 
Souter joined in the dissent with respect to the discovery rules. 
54. The amendment to Rule 11 eliminated mandatory sanctions and added the now familiar 
21-day safe harbor rule.  
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. This amendment also
resulted in the splitting of the factors adopted in 1983 from Rule 26(b)(1) into Rule 26(b)(2); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
57. Carrington, supra note 51, at 305-10. 
58. Kauffman, supra note 30. 
10
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course, led to a lack of uniformity across the country with respect to 
mandatory initial disclosures.59 
The leading response to the combination of changes in 1983 and 
1993 was to call for “a moratorium on ignorance and procedural law 
reform.”60 Specific to Rule 26(a)(1), critics again assailed the lack of 
empirical evidence in support of the rule change.61 It appears that the 
committee found support for the rule change in two articles written by 
Wayne Brazila professor and later magistrate judgeand Judge 
William Schwarzerthe head of the FJC at the time.62 These articles were 
not empirical studies; they were well informed, but mostly impressionistic 
accounts of modern discovery. Related to the question of empirical 
evidence, critics also wondered why the committee acted with such haste 
instead of waiting to see how local courts that had adopted their own 
mandatory initial disclosure rules fared.63 Ultimately, there was a sense 
that the committee acted at once with great hubris and naiveté, adopting a 
rule intended to achieve “cultural change” but that in reality allowed for 
district courts to all but ignore the rule change.64 
No moratorium was adopted, but the committee did engage in some 
soul searching. Following this firestorm, the committee conducted a self-
study of judicial rulemaking procedures.65 One of the main suggestions 
from the self-study was to urge the committee to request and use more 
59. Id. 
60. Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for A Moratorium, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 855 (1993); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 810 (“[When Rule 26(a) was proposed 
for adoption there was] virtually no empirical study of the current practice of such informal discovery, 
the efficacy of such experiences, or the results of informal discovery.”). 
61. Burbank supra note 60, at 845 (“Again, there was little relevant empirical evidence. . . .”). 
62. Carrington, supra note 51, at 304 (explaining that the committee also reached out in a
targeted way to certain constituents).  
Drafts of a disclosure rule were circulated to law teachers and to bar groups that had 
expressed an interest in the work of the committee, or in the specific idea of disclosure 
requirements. Suggestions were received and considered, and some were adopted, notably 
those of an 18-member committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers.  
Id. at 305-06. 
63. Burbank supra note 60, at 845 (“[I]ndeed, the Committee repeatedly rejected pleas to stay 
its hand pending the evaluation of experience under local rules.”). According to Paul Carrington, 
“several” district courts had experimented with mandatory initial disclosures. Carrington, supra note 
51, at 304. Yet, the rulemaking committee undertook no formalized study of how those district courts 
had fared.  
64. Burbank supra note 60, at 846 (“Moreover, one would have thought both that care in
drafting should produce an easily comprehensible rule and that a vehicle of cultural change should 
not be riddled with escape hatches.”). 
65. A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long
Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 711 (1995). 
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empirical work before making changes to the rules.66 With respect to 
discovery, the committee formed a sub-committee to examine discovery 
in greater detail.67 The sub-committee and greater committee also sought 
out empirical research on the mandatory initial disclosure rule that had 
been adopted to determine how it was working in practice.68 It received 
this information from both the FJC and the RAND Corporation.69 The 
committee also organized a conference in Boston on rules reform that 
resulted in a symposium of articles that were published in the Boston 
College Law Review.70 In addition to the Boston conference, the 
committee held a smaller conference in San Francisco.71 In other words, 
the committee commissioned empirical work and did broader outreach to 
stakeholders in the rules—judges, lawyers, and academics. 
Once it had this information, the committee once again adopted 
another discovery reform. In 2000, the “opt-out” provision of Rule 
26(a)(1) was eliminated, meaning that all federal courts would abide by a 
uniform mandatory initial disclosure rule.72 However, the scope of 
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) was also modified to only include a party’s 
claim or defense, allowing the party to expand its inquiry regarding the 
subject matter of the claim upon a showing of good cause.73 This “diluted 
disclosure rule,”74 while characterized as modest, was still met with 
criticism. 
Critics mainly noted that while the committee looked at empirical 
evidence, the rule it proposed did not line up with that evidence. 
Specifically, the studies of lawyers and judges who used the broader 
mandatory initial discovery rule—one that applied to the subject matter—
found it to work quite well.75 More generally, studies showed that, in most 
66. Id. at 699. 
67. Kauffmann, supra note 30.
68. Id. (“The Committee’s efforts were informed by empirical research that suggested that some 
form of mandatory disclosure was in place in a majority of the districts; that attorneys who had 
practiced disclosure were highly satisfied with it; and that the fear of satellite litigation with respect 
to disclosure was unfounded.”). 
69. Stempel, supra note 2, at 555. 
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment, subdiv. (b)(1)
(explaining that “[c]oncerns about costs and delay of discovery have persisted” in spite of previous 
revisions to the discovery provisions).  
74. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to the Hon. 
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 7 (May 18, 1998). 
75. Stempel, supra note 2, at 578 (“A fair reading of the FJC and Rand studies does not suggest 
that the current ‘subject matter’ scope of discovery is a particular problem.”). “Committee Member 
Judge Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) . . .  [e]mphasized that the empirical data available suggested that 
12
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cases, discovery was not that expensive and that it was not the nature of 
the discovery rules driving the cost, but the stakes of any particular case.76 
Critics also expressed concern that the committee had succumbed to 
effective lobbying by powerful attorney groups like the American College 
of Trial Lawyers.77 Finally, there was concern that the committee had 
become too political.78 
There was no time for the committee to rest, however, because it was 
already considering the question of e-discovery and how it should be 
incorporated and dealt with in the federal civil rules. Even before 2000, a 
sub-committee on e-discovery was formed.79 That sub-committee 
convened two “mini-conferences” on e-discovery in San Francisco and in 
New York City.80 Various lawyers, litigation specialists, technology 
experts, and judges were invited to present and discuss the issues.81 The 
conferences were informal, invite-only, and not recorded or otherwise 
publicized.82 In 2001, the FJC conducted studies regarding judicial 
experience with e-discovery.83 As it had with the 2000 mandatory initial 
disclosure rule, the committee reached out to those who had expressed 
interest in the issue of e-discovery.84 This outreach was broader, however, 
including about 200 people.85 The committee sought informal input on 
some “trial” rules in advance of the committee drafting its formal 
proposals.86 Following all of this groundwork, the committee held a 
larger, formal e-discovery conference at Fordham Law School in New 
York City.87 
the current broad scope of discovery was not viewed as a problem by lawyers, citing the proceedings 
at the 1997 Boston College conference in particular support of this view.” Id. at 571. Judge Scheindlin 
also noted that academics and “neutral bar associations” proposed narrowing the rule to claims and 
defenses. Id. 
76. Id. at 573-80.
77. Id. at 588-89. 
78. Id. at 618 (“In short, the Advisory Committee vote on scope of discovery, despite a debate 
of considerable sophistication, in the end resembled Capitol Hill as much as a judicial deliberation.”).  
79. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 196 (2006). 
80. Id. at 192. 
81. Id.
82. Id. 
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These efforts resulted in the fourth major period of modern discovery 
reform—the 2006 e-discovery amendments.88 Unlike the previous 
discovery periods, these rules proved to be rather non-controversial. 
While there were some substantive debates about the normative choices 
within the rules, there was little or no criticism of the process itself.89 
Indeed, even a scholar who expressed general “gloom” about the 
rulemaking process overall noted that the e-discovery rules were a place 
where the committee showed its ability “to lead and innovate.”90 
This relative calm did not last long, however. The perception that 
discovery was still a challenge for the civil justice system pushed the 
committee to convene the 2010 Duke Conference on Civil Litigation.91 
The conference spawned a discovery sub-committee. The conference not 
only allowed for in-person discussion about issues like discovery, it also 
produced a great deal of internal and external empirical research.92 This 
research presented a challenge to the committee and its sub-committee, 
however, because it was often at loggerheads. Most famously, one FJC 
study found that the median discovery costs for plaintiffs amounted to 
$15,000 and the median costs for defendants amounted to $20,000.93 A 
related study determined that higher costs are associated with cases where 
the parties have more at stake.94 In contrast, a survey of corporate legal 
counsel conducted by the Institute for the Advancement of the American 
88. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and 
the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 234 (2010) 
89. See, e.g., Laura Catherine Daniel, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback and
Quick-Peek Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 669 (2005) (“[B]ecause [clawback and quick-peek 
agreements] run contrary to the common law, pose thorny ethical dilemmas, and risk losing their force 
with other parties or in other fora, they should not substitute for a traditional privilege review even if 
ultimately condoned in the Federal Rules.”). 
90. Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 447, 449 (2013). 
91. See Coleman, supra note 42, at 1714. 
92. See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, Empirical Research, Duke Law School (May 10-11, 
2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-
projects-rules-committees/2010-civil [https://perma.cc/7LMV-S683]. 
93. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, National, Case-based Civil Rules Survey,
Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 1, 
35, 37 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3DF-N5Y4]. 
94. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate
Analysis, Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 
1, 5, 7 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fjc_litigation_costs_in_civil_cases_-
_multivariate_analysis_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMW4-8XSV]. The study found that for both 
plaintiffs and defendants, “a 1% increase in stakes was associated with a 0.25% increase in total” 
discovery costs. Id. 
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Legal System found that counsel believed that discovery costs in federal 
court were not proportional to the value of the case 90% of the time.95 The 
potential and limits of empirical research were readily apparent. 
The 2010 Duke Conference ushered in the fifth major period of 
discovery reform. The most notable change to the discovery rules in 2015 
was revised Rule 26(b)(1).96 The rule was amended to include 
proportionality within the definition of the scope of discovery.97 Five of 
these factors were taken directly from Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which was a 
section of the discovery rules that explicitly granted the court power to 
limit discovery.98 Those factors—(i) whether the “burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” (ii) “the amount in 
controversy,” (iii) “the parties’ resources,” (iv) “the importance of the 
issues at stake,” and (v) the “importance of discovery in resolving the 
issues”—were joined by one additional factor: “the parties’ relative access 
to relevant information.”99 
This proportionality rule was extraordinarily controversial. A 
detailed account of this controversy is beyond the scope of this Article.100 
In brief, however, people disagreed as to whether this was a simple change 
of moving one part of the rule to a place where it would be front of mind 
for judges or whether this was a complete departure from traditional 
discovery norms because it restricted the scope of discovery.101 The 
committee attempted to mitigate the controversy by editing its committee 
note to respond to some of the major concerns, but at the end of the day, 
the committee found itself mired in a great deal of controversy and, one 
might even say, some bad press.102 
Even while this controversy was brewing, however, the committee 
was already considering a new approach to gathering information for its 
95. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, U.S. COURTS 1, 83 (Apr. 10-11, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2014-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TW67-AU3X]. Another study by the American College of Trial Lawyers Task 
Force on Discovery found that almost half of the respondents “believed that discovery is abused in 
almost every case, with responses being essentially the same for both plaintiff and defense lawyers.” 
Id. 
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
97. Id. 
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 100.  For a broader discussion of the controversy, see Patricia W. Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff 
Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition 
of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (2016). 
101.  Id. 
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next potential set of rule proposals. Following the brouhaha over 
proportionality, the committee appeared keen on taking a chance with this 
new approach. In addition to informal and formal information gathering, 
commissioned empirical work, and outside empirical work, the committee 
is now engaging in pilot projects.103 The committee has developed two 
pilot projects—one on expedited procedures and one on mandatory initial 
disclosures.104 The latter is directly related to discovery and further along, 
so this Article will focus on that project. 
In the mandatory initial discovery pilot, two district courts—the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona—have 
implemented a rule that requires parties making mandatory initial 
discovery responses “[t]o disclose both favorable and unfavorable 
information that is relevant to their claims or defenses regardless of 
whether they intend to use the information in their cases.”105 The project 
will run for three years with the goal of assessing “[w]hether requiring 
parties in civil cases to respond to a series of standard discovery requests 
before undertaking other discovery reduces the cost and delay of civil 
litigation.”106 The project began in May of 2017,107 and all indications 
show it is going well. While we must wait and see what the committee 
does with the information it garners from the pilot projects, it is 
undeniable that the committee is embarking on a new rulemaking R&D 
innovation. 
C. Rulemaking Innovation and the Rulemaking Flexibility Ethos 
The modern civil rulemaking process is consistently under a 
microscope, and rightfully so. It is a process that gives rise to the rules 
that govern how civil litigation works, and at the same time, it is a process 
that is uniquely open to critique due to its transparency and accessibility. 
What goes a bit under-studied—and perhaps even under-celebrated—is 
that the rulemaking process is quite flexible and adaptive. That flexibility 
is certainly demonstrated by the committee’s continuing rulemaking 
 103.  Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project: Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/321837/mandatory-initial-discovery-pilot-project-overview 
[https://perma.cc/EEX3-BEMM] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
104.  Kauffman, supra note 30. 
 105.  Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project Model Standing Order, FED. JUD. CTR., (Apr. 6, 
2017), https://www.fjc.gov/content/320224/midpp-standing-order [https://perma.cc/DHA2-LS2C]. 
106.  Id.; see generally Kauffman, supra note 30 for a detailed account of mandatory initial 
disclosure rules and the pilot projects.  
107.  Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project, supra note 103.  
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innovations. In the face of criticism—and one hopes, to create a better 
product—the committee has been willing to take different approaches to 
assessing what rules will be optimal for our justice system. 
Professor Steven Gensler has noted that Charles Clark viewed the 
committee as a body that would “[k]eep the rules vital and young,” what 
Gensler dubbed “[a] fountain of youth for the Civil Rules.”108 The 
argument goes something like this: The rules of procedure tend to harden 
over time because we get accustomed to them and because judges—given 
their discretion within the rules—tend to provide extended discussion of 
how the rules are used only when they decide to restrict them.109 The 
perception of the rules is then skewed and petrified. That hardening, Clark 
thought, could be mitigated by a committee system that would serve as a 
constant check on how the rules were working on the ground and in 
context.110 In this way, the committee would provide a flexible check on 
the rules with the goal of keeping the rules young and lively.111 
It is in this spirit that the committee innovates its rulemaking process. 
While the steps of the process are quite inflexible, the information the 
committee seeks out and receives is not. Discovery reform has been 
challenging, but from that reform the committee has adapted how it 
approaches rulemaking. First, the committee focused on empirical 
research.112 At the same time, it began to informally gather feedback, 
input, and information before embarking on major reforms.113 The 
response to these innovations was mixed, in part because the committee 
was criticized for prioritizing some empirical information over others and 
because the committee became viewed as more ideologically 
motivated.114 Even still, the committee continued to respond to critiques 
by innovating its information gathering process.115 
That brings us to today where the committee seems uniquely poised 
to both satisfy its critics and create an optimal product. The pilot projects 
hold much promise—providing hands-on information about how a rule 
change might work. Moreover, the projects are deliberative and 
thoughtful. It remains to be seen what the committee will do with the 
information it receives—a risk with any empirical information. Yet, the 
 108.  Steven S. Gensler, Ed Cooper, Rule 56, and Charles E. Clark’s Fountain of Youth, 46 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 593, 596 (2013). 
109.  Id.  
110.  Id.  
111.  Id.  
112.  See supra Section II.B.
113.  See id. 
114.  See Stempel & Mullenix, supra note 2. 
115.  See supra notes 45 to 111 and accompanying text.  
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committee’s latest innovations are encouraging. They reflect the best 
ways in which the committee should operate. To keep the rules young and 
lively, it must adapt. 
A collection of former federal civil rulemaking chairs reflected on 
the information gathering process, stating: 
That flexibility and discretion, built into the 1934 Act, has helped 
produce the continued and current success of the process. This success 
could not have happened without calls for improvement and suggestions 
for change. The Rules Committees welcome continued critical 
examination of the process and proposals to make it work better. The 
changes to the Committees’ procedures, using suggestions from varied 
voices and sources, have improved the process, within the structure of 
the Enabling Act.116 
Thus, while discovery reform will always be controversial, it has 
been a critical part of the evolving federal civil rulemaking process. With 
each major proposal, success, and failure, the committee reflected and 
altered its process. Without discovery reform, we might not have such 
robust rulemaking innovation. Hopefully, the two will continue to support 
and advance one another as the committee continues to respond to the 
evolving challenge of rulemaking reform. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic steps of the rulemaking process have remained fairly static; 
yet, some critical aspects of how the rulemakers do their work have 
changed over time. One major area of innovation is what information the 
committee considers before making the rules. Discovery reform, while 
controversial, has driven much of the innovative tools the committee has 
adopted over time. This symbiotic relationship between discovery reform 
and rulemaking innovation is key to the success of federal civil 
rulemaking in the past and going forward. 
116.  Kravitz et al., supra note 4, at 517. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/6
